TWO WEEKS TO GO: GUESSING THE ELECTIONS

The key to predicting the results of Venezuela’s gubernatorial/municipal elections on November 23rd is unquestionably an analysis of the mass abstention (on the Chavista side) in the referendum on constitutional reform one year ago.

Why did 3 million citizens fail to register a vote for these broad advances, when they had voted to reelect Chavez just one year earlier? And why did these voters refuse to cross to the opposition side and vote against the reforms?

The vast majority of individual abstentions can surely be explained by one or more of the following:

• Societal problems (mainly food supplies and crime) may have deteriorated had the reforms been passed. (The government almost immediately recognised this fact, initiating a program of “Revision, Rectification and Relaunch” to deal with these two issues)
• These problems notwithstanding, the reforms were too big a leap for the revolution at this stage. (The broad nature of the 69 reforms, and the complexity of enforcing them all, were good reasons to opt for a gradual, prioritized approach)
• Disillusionment with the slow pace of nationalizations and transfer of popular power. (Quoting Alan Woods: “…the President [had not] introduced an Enabling Act in the National Assembly to nationalize the land, the banks and the key industries under workers’ control and management. Instead of decisive action against the oligarchy, which would have enthused and mobilized the masses, the latter were presented with yet another constitutional referendum.”)
• Many did not make the effort to vote, thinking the reforms (requiring only a simple majority) would pass easily. (Just one year earlier, Chavez had been reelected with 62.84% of the vote)
• The reforms, while correct and timely, had not emerged as a result of real popular decisionmaking. (They had been formulated by President Chavez and the National Assembly, and while the campaign involved town square meetings across the country and open debate on state television, these had not altered the quantity or quality of the proposed reforms)
• Reactionary elements disguised as revolutionaries sowed fear and sabotaged parts of the campaign. (With the proposed reforms including the worst fear of the counter-revolution (the means for Chavez to seek indefinite reelection), it is clear that those in certain positions would have attempted to diminish the force of the “Si” campaign)

As one can see, none of these points apply in relation to the upcoming regional elections. If there are some I’ve missed, please add them in the comments, but it seems that there are no reasons for any significant abstention in two weeks’ time. And since the opposition only gained 200,000 votes in the year leading to 2007, we can assume that another 200,000 is the upper limit for what they can expect this time around. That means 4.7 million voters is the most we can expect to be in the opposition camp.

Reviewing the electoral map on a national scale, this means the PSUV (United Socialist Party) only has to minimise abstention to sweep the 22 contested states, the Capital District of Caracas, and some 330 municipalities.

Advertisements