The 26 laws which Chavez passed by decree on the last possible day of his 18-month Enabling Law power should cast minds back to 2001, when 49 decreed laws dramatically upset economic elites and provided a glimpse into the mindset and ideology of a far less experienced President. Despite occasional decree power being a longstanding feature of Venezuelan democracy, the 49 laws provided the legitimate grounds and impetus for any and all possible means to overthrow the democratically-elected Chavez.
If the opposition are correct this time around, these 26 decreed laws expose the naked autocracy of Chavez. Indeed, certain of these laws were included in two blocks of proposed changes to the constitution (totalling 69 reforms) which were narrowly defeated in a popular vote just nine months ago. There’s no way of knowing which of those 69 reforms were the most popular, but the opposition have always interpreted the result to mean that each and every one of those proposed reforms was thereafter dead in the water, and not conscientiously available to be submitted to another vote, even as individual items.
If the opposition want to strike down any of the 26 laws, they simply need to collect petitions from as little as 5% of the electorate, and then hope to win their motion with at least 50% of a popular vote (as per the 1999 constitution). Let us recall that nine months ago, the defeat of the 69 reforms was entirely due to a large proportion of Chavistas abstaining from the vote. If any of the 26 laws are as unpopular as the opposition believe, having them reversed should be straightforward. But will we see any attempt on their part to use the constitutional power and push for an electoral majority?
Even the enabling law itself, which allows the National Assembly to grant periods of decree power to the president, is open to the voice of the electorate. But I would propose that the most dangerous law to the opposition is one of the decreed 26: that Chavez now has the power to appoint regional officials. This appears to be a critical element of the planned parallel state, which is eventually intended to supplant the existing structure of nationwide governance. If this is achieved, state governors would be phased out by their regional representatives, primarily appointed by Chavez but later elected by the PSUV.
The law concerning regional officials was originally presented in the 69 rejected reforms, but never explained in sufficient detail by Chavez in his campaigning. He reasoned that they would receive state funds to plan and develop new regions designated according to their productivity or geography, rather than the arbitrary borders of existing states, which divide agricultural capacity and similar industry. He noted that state governors, especially those in the opposition, seem to do relatively little with the federal funds apportioned to them. However, he never suggested that the concept of regional officials are ultimately intended to replace the governors in the new structure of revolutionary democracy.
Of course, this would spell doom for those in the opposition who do not believe joining the PSUV is a democratic option. They are outnumbered in today’s political arrangement and would be increasingly outnumbered if they all became a counterweight within the PSUV. Their only option is to resist “revolutionary democracy” until the last, nurturing the hope that the Venezuelan population will vote definitively against that project before they truly understand what it means.
Good post but you spoil it all by using “opposition speak” with the word “autocracy”. Why not use “dicator”, or “tyrant” or “totalitarian” and go the whole way?
The 26 laws are completely constiutional and legal within the framework of the Ley Habilitante. This should and must be emphasized.
The fact that some laws may not be popular and reflect some of the reforms defeated last year, has nothing to do wuth being “autocratic”. As you rightly say, how do we know what reforms were unpopular?
“Chavez now has the power to appoint regional officials. This appears to be a critical element of the planned parallel state, which is eventually intended to supplant the existing structure of nationwide”
Note – the regional officials will work in conjuntion with the communcal councils to develop certain geographical areas. This is construictive and, hopefully, at the same time the existing state structures will be weakened, especially those of mayors and governos. Why? The current structures are a throwback to the days of the Spanish empire and the state structure is still designed to virtually encourage corruption, trafficking of influences and all the things the opposition and parts of chavismo complain about.
The only way forward in a revolutionary and not reform or revisionist sense is to dismantle existing state structures whther by consitutional reform or new laws.
Also, note that none of the opposition spokesman have talked about using the constitution to repeal any of these laws. They speak about the laws being “unconstitutional” and the government being “illegitimate” – same as in late 2001 and 2002.
They want to go to the street and protest about the 26 laws as well as the inbalitaciones. Destabilization is the word which they used in 2007 after the RCTV case and continued with this and managed to block the reforms.
The same strategy will be used again and the heat is being turned up in the media. After 10 years of this it’s worth considering if an armed revolution would have been better – ortaking drastic action after the coup.
Half the problem is IMPUNITY and the other half was caused by Chávez himself by granting AMNSTY to the fascists last year.
This was and still is seen as a sign of weakness. Believe me, none of the opposition leaders will hesitate to pull the trigger and create a massive witch hunt if they ever get back into power. This si why we need armed militias and an ideologized army reserve….just in case.
“If the opposition are correct this time around, these 26 decreed laws expose the naked autocracy of Chavez.”
..only if they’re correct!
The opposition are impotent at the ballot box if anything crucial to the revolution is at stake. They know from last December they will never get any of the Chavista vote. The reform to allow a third presidential term will pass with 60% next year. The oppos are also impotent in the street.
I think we wait until this blows over. Roll on november…..
Carlos – roll on November.
The noise in Globo is incredible. Fedecámeras, Conindustria, Consecomercio – all reliving the precoup days of 2001 – 2002 with aggressive speeches and provocatie words and phrases -such as the governemnt is “illegitimate” accdording to Miguel Otero. “Expropriaciones confiscatorias” Nelson Maldonado of Fedecámaras (an oxymoron if ever I heard one) – in other words nonsense spoken agressively to deceive the viewers of Globo.
In fact, Maldonado said that “privte property was a “human right”. Is it really? Jean Pierre Prouhdon had it right when he uttered his most famous quote: “Property is theft”.
On the other hand, read Quico’s commentary on these 26 laws. For him it’s just “paja” and IMO, the opposition is just using any excuse to cause problems.
It’s all about destabilization looking to November 23rd. What we really need as a backdrop is:
1) Evo survives the referndum on Sunday
2) Correa manages to implant the new constitution in Ecuador.
If both or just one fails, then Venezuela will be “isolated” in the world according to the local press. These stories are probably already written and ready to go next week!!!
Globo can scream and wheeze but they are preaching to an aging choir. Have you seen the “30 segundos de la opposicion” on VTV? Like the Ud. Lo Vio but with better material!
I read Quico’s piece. I also nearly published a post which attempted to analyze the oppo mindset and if it ever sees the light of day I will have to include the ‘paja’ thing. I think it’s partly an attempt to mock chavismo to make themselves feel superior, and partly an attack on the laws to make themselves feel better because they can’t do a damn thing about them.
They were rationalizing that the laws which reduce the power of state governors simply make legal what was already being doing illegally.
I was also trying to analyze Chavez to work out whether he was under any stress….some clips suggested it but after seeing his performance in Argentina, I really don’t think so.